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The Changing Role of the State in the Italian Healthcare System 
ABSTRACT 
The present study describes and explains the changing role of the state in the Italian 
healthcare system since the beginning of the 1970s, with a particular focus on develop-
ments following 1978 when the healthcare system was transformed from a social insur-
ance system into a national health service. In order to address these changes in a sys-
tematic way, we track healthcare system development along three dimensions: regula-
tion, financing, and service provision. With regard to regulation, we observe a relative 
retreat of the state due to decentralization processes and internal market mechanisms. 
Quantitative measures for the financing and service provision dimension also indicate a 
modest relative retreat of the state. Taking regional data into account, we identify a clear 
North-South-divide in the public/private mix of financing and service provision. Al-
though the focus of the paper is to describe the changing role of the state in the Italian 
healthcare system, we also offer preliminary explanations. We seek to identify the role 
of exogenous shocks such as economic crises versus endogenous stressors specific to 
the healthcare system itself (i.e. inherent inefficiencies) on healthcare system change. 
Therefore, the paper aims to provide a tentative, yet dynamic account of healthcare sys-
tem change that is both descriptive and explanatory. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The Italian National Health Service (NHS) represents a healthcare system in flux. Since 
its inception in 1978, many changes have been made to the NHS’s regulatory structures 
that have substantially altered the role of the state in healthcare policy, particularly in 
areas of financing and service provision. Mainly, changes have culminated in the decen-
tralization of powers away from the state to the regions where issues of financing and 
the organization of services are concerned. Such developments have direct implications 
for the equity and overall performance of the healthcare system. While a study of the 
latter is beyond the scope of this paper, the present study makes a first step at describing 
and explaining changes in the Italian NHS along three key dimensions of healthcare ac-
tivity: regulation, financing, and service provision. In doing so, we also ask whether 
these changes are the result of endogenous or exogenous factors in order to understand 
the driving forces and underlying logic for healthcare reforms in Italy.  
This study therefore speaks to the larger body of welfare state literature that theorizes 
change. This includes studies observing the relationship between economic and social 
developments (Castles 2000; Pierson 2001) as well as the timing of reforms (Bonoli 
2007; Kingdon 1984). We also address approaches emphasizing the role of institutions 
in order to explain healthcare system change (Bonoli and Palier 2000; Schmid et al. 
2010). In this respect, Hacker’s description of health policy in advanced industrial coun-
tries as 'reform without change and change without reform' (Hacker 2004: 693) plays an 
important role. His comparative work points out that highly visible market reforms 
lagged far behind their rhetoric while crucial institutional change took place as conver-
sion and drift (see Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
The paper is organized in three empirical parts: first, we examine changes taking 
place in the regulation of the NHS. Not only descriptive, this section will provide an 
explanatory account of change that asks, are changes in regulation responses to exoge-
nous pressures such as global economic crises or demographic change, or, are they 
rather rooted in endogenous problems specific to the healthcare system itself such as 
inherent sources of inefficiency (as defined by Cacace et al. 2008). Once developments 
in regulation are defined and explained, we then proceed to discuss changes in financing 
and service provision. In these latter empirical sections, we will identify the main trends 
to be observed over the past four decades at both the national and regional level, where 
data is available. Whereas our discussion of regulation and financing takes off the early 
1970s, we begin our study of service provision only in 1988 due to data limitations. The 
object of our analysis will be to identify changes in the role of the state, while also link-
ing trends to reforms discussed in the section on regulation. In a final section, we con-
clude on our findings for changes in the role of state in regulation, financing, and ser-
vice provision, as well as the explanatory factors underpinning these changes.  
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2 CHANGES IN REGULATION 
In order to capture changes in the regulation of Italian healthcare system, we divide our 
observation period into four formative periods: (1) prior to the introduction of the NHS 
in 1978, (2) the establishment and expansion of the NHS between 1978 and 1992, (3) 
decentralizaton and market reforms between 1992 and 2001, and (4) the new attempts at 
regulative recentralization (since 2001). 
2.1 Prior to the introduction of the NHS (until 1978) 
Prior to the establishment of the Italian NHS in 1978, the Italian healthcare system was 
characterized by principles of selective coverage, according to which citizens were in-
sured on the basis of occupation, mainly agrarian versus industrial, but also in terms of 
geographic area, with Center-Northern regions as well as urban areas entertaining better 
access to primary and hospital care than their Southern and suburban counterparts 
(Fargion 2006). Within this system of social insurance, several sickness funds offered 
coverage that varied widely; and the provision of services rested informally with the 
family and formally with solidaristic networks of a secular, religious, or professional 
kind (Ferrera 1993, 1998; Vicarelli 1997; Paci 1989; Fargion 2006). This left little space 
for state involvement in healthcare, and immense disparities between demographic 
groups quickly ensued leaving some seven percent of the population uninsured (Lo 
Scalzo et al. 2009: 19). These inequalities, coupled with a social insurance system that 
had essentially gone bankrupt by the mid-1970s, growing public dissatisfaction, as well 
as strong social and political support for change, induced policy makers to search for 
radically new solutions outside the healthcare system (Neri 2009). Amongst other fac-
tors, the ideological preferences of the political left that favored equality in healthcare 
met with the economic concerns of the political right that viewed the Italian healthcare 
system as a financial burden (Brown 1984). By virtue of its highly centralized and uni-
versalistic nature, as well as its relative success at cost containment, the NHS model 
represented the most viable alternative both financially and politically for both parties. 
2.2 Establishment and expansion of the NHS (1978-92) 
Following the English model, the Italian NHS established universality, equality, and 
uniformity of services that were free upon point of delivery (France 2006). By turning 
to an English-style NHS, not only could Italy solve the problem of selective coverage 
by introducing universalism, it was also argued that a centralized system of financing 
would allow the government to retain better control of spending. However, unlike in 
England, the setting of budgets in the Italian context would not prove to be effective, as 
regions were not held accountable for overspending. Where regions exceeded their lim-
its, the central government covered the deficit; thereby creating negative incentives for 
both regions and providers to exceed their budgets. As such, NHS spending quickly es-
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calated since the mid-1980s making a second round of reforms during the early 1990s 
necessary.  
As will soon become evident in tracking the developments for this case, regulatory 
activity in Italy has been mainly targeted at meeting the challenges brought on by prob-
lems associated with the controlling of regional spending and overall financing in 
healthcare – a rather atypical feature for an NHS system (see Schmid et al. 2010). How-
ever, the problem of expenditure in the Italian case is very much related to the challenge 
of controlling provider (but also regional) behavior, which is typical for NHS systems. 
The central government’s response to these challenges has been manifold; however, due 
to limitations in space, we wish to highlight two of the main trends affecting regulation 
that began during the 1990s: (1) the progressive decentralization of healthcare financ-
ing; and (2) the introduction of the internal market. It is particularly the latter develop-
ment that has had profound implications for provider behavior.  
As a first step at understanding why and what changes were made to the financing of 
this healthcare system, one must begin by looking at provisions set up in the originally 
established NHS in 1978. These included a three tier structure involving the national 
government, the regions, and local health authorities (currently the Aziende sanitarie 
locali, ASL), the latter of which were organized by local governments in order to reflect 
the balance of power existing between locally elected political parties. Whereas the cen-
tral government was tasked with setting ceilings on spending by regions, as well as re-
distributing tax financing through the National Health Fund which favored the poorer 
South, it was the ASL that ultimately decided on how funding would be spent within the 
regions. Indeed, as Fargion (1992, 2006) reports, this policy did initially succeed: 
whereas in 1977 regional health expenditure varied from 36 percentage points above the 
national average in the Center-North and expenditure in the South fell 28 percentage 
points below the national average in the South, by 1987 this variation had been success-
fully halved.  
Despite the success of reducing interregional disparities, the decoupling of central-
ized financing and decentralized spending, together with poor oversight and monitoring 
on the part of the central government led to gross fiscal irresponsibility during the 1980s 
(France 2006; 2005) and ceilings set by the Treasury were regularly exceeded by the 
regions’ ASL. In part, this was due to the fact that these ceilings were systematically set 
low by the Treasury, thereby making it necessary for regions to spend beyond their 
means. Consequently, budget deficits became the norm. These financing problems met 
with a highly instable economic climate in which despite constant annual GDP growth, 
extraordinarily high public household deficits and increasing unemployment rates 
marked the entire period of the 1980s and early 1990s in Italy. 
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2.3 Decentralization and internal market reforms (1992-2001) 
At the beginning of the 1990s high public deficits became a hot political issue as they 
jeopardized Italy’s admission into the European Monetary Union. The Maastricht crite-
ria, established in 1992, permitted annual deficits up to three percent of the GDP – only 
a quarter of the additional funds the Italian state had to borrow the previous year. Italy 
had to radically reduce public spending in order to member the Eurozone. At the same 
time, the traditional party system collapsed due to a series of scandals linked to corrup-
tion and fraud. Many well established politicians had to finish their career making room 
for technocratic caretakers to take over. Hence, tremendous financial problems were 
met by policy makers set on finding solutions (Natali 2004). 
As a result, two laws were passed under the center-left Giuliano Amato and Carlo A. 
Ciampi cabinets in 1992 and 1993 (Legislative Decrees 502 and 517, respectively) that 
gave regions greater responsibility in covering deficit spending for any costs not associ-
ated with centralized standards for care, the latter of which became the main focus of 
the central government. The rationale behind the two laws rested on the notion that by 
allocating financial responsibility for healthcare at a more local, or in this case, interme-
diary level, the healthcare needs of regional populations would be better served, as re-
gions – not the central government – would have a clearer understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of their local system of services and could better sustain 
economies of scale (Maino 2010; Neri 2009). Thus, decentralization would contain 
costs and enhance efficiency.  
Not only setting in motion what would become a lengthy and ongoing process of de-
centralization, the 1992/3 laws also introduced the opportunity for a radically new 
model of governance to emerge within Italian healthcare. More specifically, greater fi-
nancial responsibilities for regions were coupled with greater authority to organize and 
administer healthcare services locally (Petretto et al. 2003). This was largely due to the 
introduction of a new governance model that allowed for three inter-related changes in 
regulation: (1) regions were given the freedom of infusing greater competition into their 
regional healthcare services; (2) this meant the possible introduction of a purchaser-
provider split; and (3) it also implied a change in administrative style and orientation, 
away from traditional top-down decision making that disadvantaged regions, to the 
principles of the New Public Management which favored business-style management 
practices that would be instituted at the regional level.  
Accordingly, Italian regulatory developments mimicked those seen in England just 
two years earlier, however, unlike in England where the internal market had been uni-
formly introduced, in Italy regions were given the liberty of deciding how and in what 
manner they would adopt this new form of regulation and significant interregional dif-
ferences have since emerged: Whereas Lombardy has actively embraced the internal 
 - 5 - 
market principles advanced by the 1992/3 reforms, the remaining regions have largely 
engaged in one of two types of alternative governance models. The one, prevalent 
amongst regions of the Center-North and North-East, has elsewhere been referred to as 
a governance model of ‘cooperation and integration’ that sees regional health services 
as forming a network in which each provider – whether public or private – is an irre-
placeable node that complements rather than competes with other providers in the sys-
tem; the second model, prevalent amongst regions of the South, has been referred to as a 
governance model of ‘residual-incrementalism’ that is defined by an absence of a clear 
regulatory style and is characterized by a tendency to waver between integration and 
cooperation as governance tools (Neri 2006, 2008). 
Despite this variation in governance models, the introduction of the internal market 
has had a significant impact on service providers in Italy, as it has meant a greater influx 
of private providers in many regions, as well as a significant redefinition of remunera-
tion and accreditation practices (Neri 2009). Taken together, the new emphasis on com-
petition and market principles in the Italian NHS represents a significant break in regu-
latory style and ideology. Interestingly, the first proposals for such changes can be 
traced back to as early as 1984 in Italy, however, it was not until the early 1990s when 
similar developments across Europe were taking place and when public dissatisfaction 
with the healthcare system in Italy had reached 88 percent that the 1992/3 reforms 
would be realized (Neri 2009; Mossialos 1997). Accordingly, the confluence of system-
specific deficits, public pressure, and an international policy zeitgeist significantly con-
tributed to, if not determined, the timing of the Italian reforms, whereas the surrounding 
economic climate only helped to highlight their urgency.  
While reform efforts to introduce a new model of competition-based governance 
within the Italian NHS did not have the dramatic impact they had promised, the process 
of decentralizing healthcare financing that the 1992/3 laws set in place would not be 
contained. Recall that in holding regions financially responsible for deficits, the reforms 
aimed at reducing NHS spending. However, the ongoing under-funding and poor moni-
toring of regions resulted in little change in spending. Moreover, as Italy approached the 
prospects of having to meet the Maastricht criteria in the late 1990s, an additional round 
of healthcare reforms would soon be deemed necessary in order to contain costs (France 
2009). Indeed, the pressure of qualifying for the European Monetary Union detracted 
from what was otherwise a period of economic upturn in Italy starting in 1997.  
Interestingly, despite what had hitherto been an unsuccessful attempt at reigning in 
NHS spending, the central government continued on its path of decentralizing health-
care in the late 1990s. This development can be explained along two lines, both defined 
politically. First, after a short governmental interlude, the center-left regained office un-
der the leadership of Romano Prodi (years 1996-1998), followed by Massimo D’Alema 
 - 6 - 
(years 1998-2000), who was then succeeded by Giuliano Amato (years 2000-2001) who 
had first held office during the very passing of Legislative Decree 517 in 1993. Given 
this consistency in political leadership, it is therefore altogether unsurprising to see at 
this time a continuation of decentralization as a policy solution for reigning in the per-
ennial problem of uncontrollable healthcare spending. However, national electoral poli-
tics alone do not tell the whole story; rather developments also taking place at the re-
gional level in the form of the political mobilization of the (far) right also play an im-
portant role in explaining the advancement of decentralization in healthcare during the 
late 1990s. These are elsewhere discussed at length (Fargion 2006) and will be summa-
rized here briefly by stating that the emergence of the political party Lega Nord was a 
source of great political pressure such that regional empowerment in many areas of so-
cial policy including healthcare was granted by the central government as a means of 
quelling political unrest and separationist tendencies in the North. Decentralization was 
therefore a kind of panacea: an important policy legacy for the center-left to return to as 
it grappled with the ongoing financing woes of the NHS, as well as the political inter-
ests of what had become a very vocal opposition.  
But how exactly was decentralization furthered in the reforms of the late 1990s? 
Mainly, changes during this period surmounted in the total regionalization of financing 
with the establishment of a regional tax (IRAP) in 1998 (Legislative Decree 446 in 
1997) and a system of revenue sharing between regions based on value added tax 
(VAT) and an increased share in excise duties on oil products and, to a lesser extent, 
income tax (Legislative Decree Number 56 in 2000). This radically new system of fi-
nancing did away with the earmarked funding coming from the central government’s 
National Health Fund, which was instead replaced by an Equalization Fund that was 
created to redistribute financing to regions on the basis of geographic and population 
size, healthcare needs of the population, and fiscal capacity.  
The rationale behind these reforms was to better couple economic trends with health-
care expenditure (Bordignon and Giarda 2004). Given the climate of economic growth 
that Italy experienced at the end of the 1990s up until 2001, such reasoning was well 
received as a step forward in better financing the NHS. However, the regionalization of 
financing was also intended to hold regions more accountable for their spending by giv-
ing them various sources of financing to draw from. These sources were expanded 
when, in August 2000, the central government gave regions the green light on various 
other means of revenue raising for any costs exceeding regional thresholds. This has 
meant the increase of co-payments, the introduction of a regional addition to personal 
income tax, and the possibility of further increases to IRAP (Fargion 2006).  
As the Amato cabinet gave way to the center-right party led by Silvio Berlusconi in 
2001, the regulation of healthcare financing saw further changes in the way of a height-
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ened emphasis on privatization and the passing of a constitutional amendment in March 
2001 (Title V) that re-emphasized both the responsibilities of the regions in organizing 
and delivering healthcare services, as well as the rights of Italian residents to care that is 
free at the point of delivery. This placed greater pressure on regions to assure their 
populations’ coverage in line with positive and negative lists of services defined by the 
central government. By most accounts, the constitutional amendment of 2001 represents 
an important first step by the central government at trying to counter the centrifugal 
forces of healthcare decentralization that had been taking place within a larger context 
of political devolution within Italy (France 2009).  
2.4 Regulative recentralization (2001 to present) 
As the past decade unfolded, the central government went on to place greater emphasis 
on monitoring regional performance in healthcare. Within this context, it is important 
to note the role that the ‘State and Regional Accords’ – established in the Conference of 
the State and Regions – have played in defining regulatory policy during this period. Of 
particular importance were those meetings of August 2001 which aimed at controlling 
healthcare spending, as well as that of March 23, 2005, which established the ‘Pact for 
Health’ between the state and the regions (France 2007). Amongst other things, the 
pact defines a greater role for the state in financially supporting the regions, which, in 
turn, are to be held highly accountable for the efficient usage of funds granted by the 
state and the balancing of regional budgets. One driving force for this renewed effort to 
control healthcare spending concerns the ongoing pressure on the Italian government to 
meet its financial obligations to the EU regarding aggregate levels of public expendi-
ture and public debt. These obligations have been aggravated by the economic instabil-
ity brought on by the global financial crisis that began in 2001, which has caused Italy 
to experience acute economic downturn in years 2005, and 2008 to the present.  
Despite a small interlude of the central government’s reassertion in healthcare, It-
aly’s current economic circumstances have led to even greater decentralization in 
healthcare, with the passing of the most recent reform on fiscal federalism in May 2009 
(Legislative Decree 42). Much in the spirit of its predecessors, this reform grants the 
regions greater revenue raising powers in order to better match their spending powers in 
social policy. This is especially relevant where healthcare is concerned, as regions cur-
rently dedicate 70 percent of their budgets to health services and manage 90 percent of 
public expenditure on healthcare. To be introduced over the mid-term, the rationale be-
hind the 2009 law mimics that of all pre-existing efforts at decentralizing healthcare in 
Italy: by granting the regions more financial autonomy, they can be expected to better 
live within their means and spend more responsibly. In other words, the policy solution 
to the perennial problem of healthcare financing remains the same even some twenty 
years after its first emergence in 1992 –namely, continued decentralization.  
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3 CHANGES IN FINANCING 
In the financing dimension we start our observation with the development of total ex-
penditure on health since 1970. Subsequently, the level and share of public spending is 
explored in order to address the changing role of the state in health financing. Further-
more, a detailed picture of the public/private-mix is provided by an intersectoral com-
parison of the three most important healthcare sectors. We finish this section with an 
interregional perspective on the public/private-mix in healthcare financing. Concerning 
the intersectoral and the interregional analysis we can only capture the second but, yet 
far more interesting half of our period of observation due to data limitations. 
3.1 Changes in the level of financing 
Analogous to the general OECD trend, total expenditure on health exceeded the GDP 
growth in Italy after the first oil crisis. Between 1972 and 2009 total healthcare costs as 
a share of the GDP rose from 5.4 to 9.5 percent. Deflated in GDP prices of 2000, the 
real health expenditure increased from 556 to 1,948 Euros per capita. Both cost indica-
tors grew unsteadily during this time period (see figure 1). With regard to the total 
health expenditure as share of GDP, phases of strong cost increases (1970-75, 1977-80, 
1986-92, 1995-2006, and 2007-09) were interrupted by intermissions (1976-77, 1981-
86, 1992-1995, and 2007) with slight decreases. This pattern leads to a stepwise growth 
of total health expenditure as a share of the GDP. 
Figure 1 Development of total health expenditure in absolute and relative terms 
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Source: OECD (2010)  
As the temporary climaxes fall closely together with the final years of economic reces-
sion, the subsequent intermissions arouse suspicion of being merely a denominator ef-
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fect (see note [1]). But the declines in expenditure during intermissions were not only 
caused by the rather external effect of economic recovery. Taking the real health expen-
diture per capita into account, we see that the growth rate of this indicator significantly 
drops during the intermission phases. This indicates rather internal measures to contain 
costs. These phases of spending cutbacks were mostly limited to one year. Only in the 
early 1990s was strict cost-containment followed over a three year period in order to 
meet the Maastricht criteria (Lo Scalzo et al. 2009). In part, cost-containment measures 
at this time might be seen as a by-product of the 1992/3 reforms, which decentralized 
healthcare financing with an interest in cutting expenditure. However, given the sudden 
drop in financing and that cost-containment went well beyond the scope of the reforms, 
the trend observed here is rather linked to entrance into the European Monetary Union. 
Thus, the decreases of total health expenditures as a share of GDP in the intermissions 
can be explained by two cumulative factors: the external acceleration of GDP growth 
and the internal deceleration of per capita costs. In comparison to 23 OECD countries 
(see note [2]) Italian total health expenditure grew modestly during our observation pe-
riod. Between 1970 and the early 1990s, Italy spent almost the OECD average of their 
GDP for healthcare. Due to strict cost-containment, however, total health expenditure 
fell in the mid-1990s significantly below the OECD average and Italy entered the lowest 
tertil of our country sample. Although Italian health expenditure continuously increased 
between 1995 and 2006, growth rates remained in line with the OECD average. Interest-
ingly, seen in relation to other Western economies, Italy’s expenditure cannot be viewed 
as exuberant, despite the repeated grounds for reform to curb regional spending espe-
cially in the South. 
3.2 Changes in the financing structure 
With regard to the role of the state in healthcare financing we observe the development 
of public health expenditure. Compared to other OECD countries, on the eve of the first 
oil crisis Italy had a relatively high public financing share. In 1970, public sources cov-
ered 83.7 percent of health expenditure representing the fifth highest share of our coun-
try sample. The remainder was paid by private households out-of-pocket. The strong 
growth of healthcare spending in the early 1970s was mainly covered by public sources. 
Between 1970 and 1973 public health expenditure increased from 4.5 to 5.3 percent of 
GDP (see figure 2). As private sources remained relatively constant, the public share 
peaked with 86.5 percent. Ironically, this historic maximum occurred during the phase 
when Italy still belonged to the social health insurance countries and left around seven 
percent of the population uninsured (Lo Scalzo et al. 2009: 19). 
With the beginning of the first oil crisis in autumn 1973, the expansion of public fi-
nancing came to a halt. In the following four years public expenditure steadily de-
creased to 4.9 percent of GDP. In contrast to this, private sources gained ground and 
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therefore the public financing share dropped to 83.6 percent. The introduction of the 
NHS in 1978 led to a new expansion phase. Until 1980, public expenditure rose to 5.5 
percent of GDP when the second oil crisis hit the Italian economy. The government 
made several attempts to impose tight budgets and new co-payments in order to save 
taxes. The former were opposed by providers, the latter by trade unions which led to an 
uneven development during this second cost-containment phase from 1981 to 1986. In 
the end, public spending slightly decreased 0.3 percentage points while private out-of-
pocket payments increased by the same amount. The public financing share fell down to 
76.8 percent. Fueled by a strong economic growth and a continued generous household 
policy, Italy returned in 1987 to the expansion path. Within five years, public expendi-
ture skyrocketed to 6.3 percent of the GDP – an entire point more than in 1986. Private 
sources also grew but to a smaller extent. This led to a recovery of the public financing 
share which accounted 79.3 percent in 1991. 
Figure 2 Development of public and private current health expenditure 
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Source: OECD (2010) 
The Treaty of Maastricht opened in 1992 a new chapter in Italian welfare policy. While 
the expansion of expensive programs such as healthcare and pensions ran on high 
household deficits, the government had to switch to austerity policy in order to meet the 
criteria for the European Monetary Union. The most ambitious target was the upper 
level for public deficits of three percent per year. Italian fiscal policy had become de-
pendent on annual deficits above ten percent of GDP for over an entire decade. There-
fore, the government axed industrial subsidies, sold state-companies, and did not refrain 
from major cutbacks on welfare programs. Between 1991 and 1998 public spending on 
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health shrank from 6.3 to 5.2 percent of GDP. These savings were partly replaced by 
out-of-pocket payments which accounted at the beginning of the retrenchment period 
for around a sixth of health expenditure and at the end over a quarter. The public financ-
ing share finally reached its historic minimum of 70.4 percent – nearly three percentage 
points below the OECD-23 average. In 1999, the European Council permitted Italy to 
enter the Eurozone as a founding member. This allowed the Italian government to 
slacken the reins again. Except for a short-term cutback in 2007, public spending on 
health has constantly grown since the late 1990s. In 2009, public health expenditure ac-
counted for 7.3 percent of the GDP – almost two points more than at the end of the 
1990s. As private sources remained constantly on a level of about 2.1 percent of the 
GDP, the public financing share increased to 77.3 percent.  
Summing up, over our entire observation period we observe a relative retreat of the 
state in healthcare financing. Although public expenditure on health as a percentage of 
the GDP increased from 4.5 to 7.3 percent, its financing share decreased from 83.7 to 
77.3 percent. The latter was mainly driven by a strong growth of private out-of-pocket 
payments. Despite the decrease of the public financing share, with the introduction of 
the NHS public sources changed qualitatively in favor of the state as earmarked social 
health insurance contributions were replaced by taxes allowing the government a more 
flexible budget allocation. Also the economic interlinks changed. While spending cut-
backs in the 1970s and 1980s were related to economic crises, the retrenchment of the 
1990s was dedicated to the Eurozone membership. In the 2000s, neither the splash of 
the dotcom-bubble nor the recent financial crisis has thus far had a major impact on 
public expenditure. With regard to changes in financing in relation to the previously 
discussed regulatory changes, trends observed here can be said to be somewhat de-
tached from regulatory developments: while on the one hand one sees a relative retreat 
of the state in regulation and in financing, the latter – as indicated above – has been af-
fected to a much greater extent by membership in the European Monetary Union. The 
decentralization of healthcare financing does not appear to have had a great impact on 
national trends in expenditure. However, we now turn to intersectoral and interregional 
comparisons for other potential developments.  
3.3 Intersectoral comparison 
In order to investigate the trends described above in greater depth, we observe the role 
of public spending in three healthcare sectors: inpatient care, outpatient care, and medi-
cal goods. The OECD provides data on the public/private-mix within these sectors since 
1988. This period makes it possible to observe any effects of regional reforms taking off 
in 1992/3 and/or entry into the European Monetary Union. 
The overview indicates the usual pattern in OECD countries. The role of public 
spending is most prominent in the inpatient sector followed by outpatient care (see 
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figure 3). Medical goods have the least share of public financing. The strong role of 
public financing in inpatient care remained relatively stable. In 1988, public spending 
covered 92.1 percent of inpatient expenditure. During the retrenchment policy of the 
1990s this value slightly decreased to 88.1 percent in 1995. Since then public financing 
recovered again accounting for 92.8 percent of inpatient expenditure in 2009. We ob-
serve the same back-and-forth development in the outpatient sector although to a higher 
magnitude. In 1988, around 78.2 percent of outpatient expenditure was paid by public 
sources. After a short-term drop in the subsequent year public spending peaked in 1991 
when it covered 78.9 percent of outpatient expenditure. During the following retrench-
ment period, the government extended the role of co-payments which could be justified 
by two arguments. On the one hand, Italy had to tackle public deficits in order to meet 
the Maastricht criteria. On the other hand, this measure was in line with the dominating 
New Public Management ideas promoted in the 1992/3 reforms, as it fostered cost-
containment on the demand-side. The role of public spending in the outpatient sector 
shrank to 66.9 percent in 1998 – twelve percentage points less than 1991. When Italy 
was permitted to enter the Eurozone in 1999 the public financing share grew again. In 
2009, public sources covered 76.7 percent of outpatient expenditure.  
Figure 3 Public financing share in three personal healthcare sectors 
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Source: OECD (2010)  
In contrast to this, the role of public spending on medical goods reflects a different pat-
tern. At the beginning, pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances were predominantly 
financed by public sources accounting 61.5 percent in 1988. As medical goods are typi-
cally subjected to out-of-pocket payments by introducing co-payments or delisting sev-
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eral drugs from the public benefit package, the retrenchment policy of the 1990s had a 
large impact on the public-private-mix. The public financing share dropped bellow the 
50 percent level indicating a mainly privately financed sector and hit the ground in 
1996. At that time, public sources covered merely 38.3 percent of expenditure on medi-
cal goods. Up to 2001, the public financing share quickly recovered to 53.9 percent. In 
contrast to the inpatient and outpatient sectors this trend did not continue during the 
2000s. Public financing fell again below the 50 percent level accounting 45.8 percent of 
expenditure on medical goods in 2009. Hence, we find a clear privatization trend with 
regard to medical goods since the late 1980s. Concerning inpatient and outpatient care, 
the public financing share remained relatively during the last two decades. 
3.4 Interregional comparison 
Finally, we observe the changing role of the state in healthcare financing from a re-
gional perspective. For this purpose we take the WHO database “Health for All, Italy 
2010” into account. It provides data for the 20 Italian regions which are responsible for 
the organization and administration of health services, relying especially on the afore-
mentioned national VAT and the regional IRAP tax for financing. With regard to pub-
lic health expenditure, the WHO database includes figures from 1990 on. This period 
includes the entire decentralization process. It is worth noting that the Italian regions 
differ extremely with regard to their population size and economic condition. While the 
most-populous region of Lombardy has around 9.7 million inhabitants, only 127,000 
people live in Valle d’Aosta. On the other hand the latter is the richest Italian region 
with a GDP per capita of over 34,000 euro – twice as much as the level of Calabria in 
Southern Italy. The coefficient of variation indicates with 0.24 remarkable level of het-
erogeneity with respect to GDP per capita. In terms of population size the indicator re-
flects with 0.82 an extreme heterogeneity between the regions.  
At first sight, we observe a north-south-divide with regard to the role of public 
spending (see figure 4). Northern regions have the least share of public financing, cen-
tral Italy takes a middle position, and the highest public financing shares can be found 
in Southern regions. This pattern already existed in the beginning of the 1990s but the 
regions increasingly diverged in the following years. The difference between the eco-
nomically strong North and the relatively poor South accounted in 1990 for merely 3.1 
percentage points, while in 2007 the gap had widened to 8.5 points. This development 
reflects differences in the national redistribution of value added tax and the ability of 
well-off Northern households to pay for additional services out-of-pocket. 
Having a closer look at the level and change, we observe that between 1990 and 
2007 the public financing share strongly declined in nearly all Northern regions except 
for Trentino-Alto Adige. The latter can be explained by the fact that the region consists 
of two prosperous provinces with special autonomy rights which allow them to retain a 
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high share of taxes. The Italian government granted these privileges to the region in or-
der to pacify the domestic and bilateral struggles with the German-speaking majority of 
South Tyrol. The central Italian regions show no clear pattern. They rather appear to be 
subdivided into two parts alongside the north-south-divide. While the Northern part of 
central Italy, represented by the regions Umbria and Marche, also faced a strong decline 
in the public financing share, the Southern part with Abruzzo and the capital region 
Lazio had only modest cutbacks. With regard to Southern Italy, we observe only a small 
decline of public financing. The role of public sources even gained importance in 
Calabria and Basilicata. In 2007, the latter region also had the highest public financing 
share of Italian regions accounting for 85 percent of total health expenditure. 
Figure 4 Public financing share on health in the 20 Italian regions 
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Own depiction based on the NUTS-2 map of Europe; for further explanation of the region clusters see note [3]) 
Therefore, the figures indicate an increased redistribution of taxes from the North to the 
South despite increased regionalization of healthcare policy. This can be attributed to 
the role of the aforementioned Equalization Fund which compensates for interregional 
differences in population size and economy. However, it also reflects the continued fi-
nancial backing the state has afforded to the South despite insisting that the latter absorb 
the costs of regional deficits in healthcare spending (see section 2). It bears mentioning 
once again that the sole Northern region with a high public financing share consists of 
provinces with special rights allowing them to shelter their taxes from redistribution.  
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4 CHANGES IN SERVICE PROVISION 
In order to measure the changing role of the state in service provision, information on 
input resources are combined with data on output resources. Input resources indicate the 
flow of financial funds into healthcare sectors and therefore capture their size. Output 
data such as number of hospital beds are used to describe changes in the public/private-
mix of these healthcare sectors on the national and regional level. We take three per-
sonal healthcare sectors into account which cover around 95 percent of total health ex-
penditure: inpatient care, outpatient care, and medical goods. Mental care, collective 
healthcare, and unclassified providers are excluded. Finally, we combine input and out-
put indicators to estimate the development of public and private service provision in the 
Italian healthcare system. As coherent data on the relative size of the three main health-
care sectors is only available from 1988 on, the public service provision index is limited 
to the second half of our observation period. 
4.1 Changes in the service provision structure 
Hospitals play the key role in the Italian healthcare system. They provide inpatient care 
with at least one overnight stay and specialist outpatient care. In 1988 inpatient care ab-
sorbed the lion’s share of input resources reflected by 47.1 percent of personal health 
expenditure. Since then, the role of the inpatient sector remained relatively stable ac-
counting for 47.9 percent in 2009 (see figure 5). 
Figure 5 Share of input resource flows in all personal healthcare sectors 
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Source: OECD (2010) 
The outpatient sector including primary, specialist, and dental care underwent a more 
pronounced development. In 1988, outpatient services represented 29.6 percent of ex-
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penditure on personal health. The outpatient sector jumped above the 30-percent bar and 
peaked with 32.6 percent of all input resources. In the following decade, the role of the 
outpatient sector slightly decreased but remained steadily above the 30-percent-level. 
Since 1999, the relative size of the outpatient sector grew again accounting for 32.8 per-
cent of expenditure on personal health in 2009. Medical goods reflect the smallest sector 
of the Italian healthcare system. Pharmaceuticals as well as therapeutic appliances ab-
sorbed in 1988 only 23.3 percent of the input resources. In the following years the gov-
ernment increased co-payments on medical goods which affected the number of pre-
scriptions (OECD 2010). Therefore, the role of medical goods decreased to 20.6 percent 
of expenditure on personal healthcare in 1994. Up to 2001, the sector’s share recovered 
to 23.8 percent. Since then, the role of pharmaceuticals and therapeutical appliances fell 
again even bellow the 20 percent-level. In 2009, medical goods allocated only 19.3 per-
cent of all input resources – the lowest value observed. 
To sum up, throughout our observation period inpatient care remains the dominating 
healthcare sector with a relatively stable expenditure share. Outpatient care gained slight 
importance at the expense of medical goods which were the main target of the cost-
containment policy by means such as direct price control and increased copayments. 
4.2 The public/private mix in the healthcare sectors 
As we have gathered information on the size of the respective sectors and changes over 
time, the next step is to describe the changing public/private mix within each sector. 
Again, we take the three most important sectors into account: inpatient care, outpatient 
care, and medical goods.  
Starting with the inpatient sector we distinguish on the basis of ownership between 
public and private hospitals beds. In order to provide a long time series we choose total 
hospital beds including curative, rehabilative, and long-term beds within hospital facili-
ties (but not nursing homes). Non-accredited and day clinics are excluded. The classifi-
cation based on WHO data is not comparable to the new OECD concept of beds in pub-
licly owned hospitals (data only available for 2003-07) but provides consistent results 
over the observation period.  
At the beginning of our observation period Italy had a remarkably dense inpatient in-
frastructure with 10.6 beds per 1000 inhabitants (see figure 6). Most of them – more 
specific 83.4 percent in 1970 – were installed in public hospitals. In the following years, 
the share of public beds steadily increased. It peaked on an 86-percent-level in 1978 
when the NHS was introduced. During the 1980s the government closed down a lot of 
hospitals and the number of beds decreased to 7.1 per 1000 inhabitants in 1989. As pub-
lic hospitals were especially affected, the public share accounted at that time only 80.3 
percent. In 1990, the number of hospital beds increased for the first time in 15 years. 
This was only driven by an increase of private hospital beds while public beds dropped 
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again resulting in the lowest public share during our observation period of 76.5 percent. 
Up to 1997, the number of public hospital beds remained relatively stable while private 
beds faced a strong decline. Hence, the public share recovered to 82.1 percent. But since 
the late 1990s, the number of hospital beds continued to drop and again public ones de-
creased at a higher pace. In 2006, only 3.9 beds per 1000 inhabitants remained repre-
senting a value below the OECD-23 average. The number of public hospital beds 
shrank to around one third compared to the early 1970s, whereas private beds halved. 
Therefore, the public share accounted for 78.7 percent in 2006 – 7.3 points less than at 
the introduction of the NHS in 1978. 
Figure 6 Hospital ownership in number of beds per 1000 inhabitants  
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Own calculation based on WHO data (see note [4]) 
Outpatient care is mainly provided by private providers. GPs and dentists work as self-
employed physicians in their own practices. Only medical specialists perform outpatient 
services either as independent entrepreneurs or salaried public employees. As the reve-
nues of salaried physicians are part of hospital revenue, we can only identify the reve-
nues of private providers within the outpatient sector measured by the sector’s expendi-
ture share. Finally, we measure the public-private mix in the provision of medical goods 
by taking the share of public pharmacies into account. Italy belongs to the few OECD 
countries with a significant share of pharmacies owned by municipalities. Since the 
early 1990s, this share stayed at an eight-percent-level (see note [5])  
Summing up, private care dominates two of the three healthcare sectors, but plays 
only a minor role in the in the most important inpatient sector. Hospitals are tradition-
ally public but rigid closure of entire facilities led to a relative privatization trend over 
the entire observation period as well as the recent years. In contrast to this, the role of 
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public pharmacies remained stable although the dispersal of medical goods is mainly in 
the hands of private providers. Although the state has a regulatory influence on the pro-
vision of outpatient services, physicians work mainly as accredited but independent en-
trepreneurs with volume- or capitation-based fees. Even publicly employed medical 
specialists are allowed to perform outpatient services autonomously. Hence, public pro-
vision plays no role in the outpatient sector measured with OECD data.  
4.3 Interregional perspective 
In addition to the intersectional perspective on the public/private mix in healthcare pro-
vision, we now have a closer look at disparities between regions. We focus on sectors 
with public providers and take therefore hospitals as well as pharmacies into account. 
Our observation captures only recent changes as regional statistics on the public-
private-mix of hospitals and pharmacies are only available for a few years, (hospitals: 
1996-2006; pharmacies: 2005-2010). 
Figure 7 Public hospital beds in the 20 Italian regions 
±0
> 95.0
90.0–94.9
85.0–89.9
80.0 –84.9
< 80
Share of acute care beds in 
public hospitals in % (year: 2006)
Italics indicate change between
1996-2006 in percentage points 
 
North
Center
South
1996
88.3
85.3
83.3
2006
87.7
84.4
77.9
Change
−0.6
−0.9
−5.3
Level and change of public acute hospital beds in %
Legend
Source: WHO, Health for All Database, 
Italy 2010
−1.4
±0
−3.4
+4.5
−4.4
+0.3
+6.1
−0.5
−2.5
−0.1
−0.6 +5.7
−2.8
−3.7
−6.4
−1.2
−9.9
−8.2
−3.6
 
Own depiction based on the NUTS-2 map of Europe; for further explanation of the region clusters see note [3] 
Starting with the interregional perspective on public hospital infrastructure, we identify 
a general North-South-gap with some exceptions (see figure 7). In 1996, the gap be-
tween North and South concerning the share of public hospital beds accounted for five 
percentage points. Since then, the share of public hospital beds only slightly decreased 
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in the Center-North whereas it underwent a strong decline in the South. Due to this, the 
difference between Northern and Southern regions nearly doubled to 9.8 points leading 
to the contradictory picture that the heavily publicly financed Southern regions rely on 
the most privatized inpatient sectors. Therefore, the majority of services provided in 
private clinics are paid by public funds. The heavy presence of private providers in the 
South has been attributed, among other things, to the regions’ administrative and politi-
cal inefficiencies and weaknesses which fail to provide for the basic social protection of 
its people (France and Taroni 2005; Neri 2009). 
We also find some regions which do not fit in their cluster. Firstly, Lombardy sticks 
out from the Northern cluster as it faced a strong decrease of public hospital beds from a 
rather modest level. This led to what is by far the lowest share of public hospital beds in 
the Northern cluster and can be explained by their regional health policy. As the indus-
trial heart of Italy and stronghold of the political center-right parties, the Lombard re-
gion made use of the new opportunities for internal markets granted by the 1992/3 re-
forms (Frisina Doetter and Götze 2011). The regional government in Milan introduced 
the most pronounced purchaser-provider-split, also known as the ‘Lombard model’ and 
accredited a number of private hospitals. Meanwhile, in the Southern cluster Basilicata, 
which belongs to the least populated regions, is again an exception as it has a very high 
share of public hospital beds compared to its regional peers.  
Figure 8 Public pharmacies in the 20 Italian regions 
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Own depiction based on the NUTS-2 map of Europe; for further explanation of the region clusters see note [3] 
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With regard to public pharmacies, we find an even more pronounced gap between North 
and South (see figure 8). While Northern and central regions have a significant share of 
public pharmacies accounting for around ten percent, this kind of public provision is 
nearly non-existent in the South. Recent trends indicate an increase of public pharma-
cies but no catch-up in the South. Rather the North-South gap widens further. The indi-
vidual regions mainly fit into their cluster. Again Trentino-Alto Adige is an interesting 
case, as the share of public pharmacies decreased from a relatively low share compared 
to other Northern regions. As already mentioned this region consists of two different 
autonomous provinces which are in fact responsible for the organization of their health 
services. While the Italian-speaking province Trentino has one of the highest shares of 
public pharmacies accounting for 16.4 percent, there is no public pharmacy in the Ger-
man-speaking province South Tyrol. The latter can be explained that this reflects the 
institutional heritage of the Austrian healthcare system which had no tradition of public 
pharmacies. Hence, the regional data reflects only the average of two completely oppo-
site organized provinces in terms of public pharmacies.  
Summing up, general speaking we identify again a North-South-gap with regard to 
public service provision in hospital and pharmaceutical care. Interestingly the difference 
is inverse to the findings in the financing dimension – the Northern regions have the 
highest shares of public provision but the lowest share of public financing. As the gen-
eral level of public provision is mostly related to big regional clusters (North vs. South) 
we suspect economic as well as cultural reasons as the main explanation. In contrast to 
this, some regions show a distinct development compared to their cluster, indicating the 
effects of regional health policy. Especially the strict purchaser-provider split in Lom-
bardy led to a pronounced privatization trend in the hospital sector compared to other 
(more leftist governed) Northern regions. The varied results observed here across Italy’s 
regions can be linked to the freedom granted to regions in the 1992/3 reforms to intro-
duce internal market mechanisms at their discretion.  
4.4 The changing role of the state in service provision 
In order to assess the changing role of the state in service provision it is necessary to 
combine the sector specific data by generating a formula for an assessment of the role of 
the state over all healthcare sectors. For this purpose, we suggest a Public Provision In-
dex (PPI), which results by multiplying the share of resources allocated to each sector 
with its respective public/private-mix of service provision (see Rothgang et al. 2008). 
The PPI ranges from zero (no public provision) to one hundred, meaning all hospitals 
and pharmacies are owned by the state or municipalities as well as all physicians work 
as public employees. By doing this over a period of several years, we obtain one con-
densed indicator for the role of the state over all sectors and its change over time. As we 
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only have coherent data for all necessary indicators between 1988 and 2006, we can 
only capture the second half of our observation period. 
Starting with 1988, inpatient services consumed 47.1 percent of personal healthcare 
resources. Multiplied by the share of public hospital beds which was at that time 82.8 
percent, the inpatient sector contributed 39 points to the PPI. In addition, medical goods 
(23.3 percent of input resources) were also dispensed by public providers as eight per-
cent of the pharmacies were owned by municipalities. This contributes an additional 1.9 
points to the PPI. Hence, the PPI accounted for 40.9 points in 1988 which reflected 
nearly the average of the OECD world but a relatively low value within the NHS sub-
group (Rothgang et al. 2010: 67).  
Figure 9 Public provision index in percent  
 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
PPI 40.9 36.8 39.0 39.7 39.5 39.6 39.3 38.4 38.7 39.0 
Own calculation, weighted public/private mix of three personal healthcare sectors 
Within two years the PPI dropped 4.1 points accounting for 36.8 in 1990 (see figure 9). 
This is an effect of a twofold development. On the one hand, an implicit privatization as 
the private outpatient sector gained importance at the expense of the inpatient sector. On 
the other hand, an explicit privatization as the number of private hospital beds strongly 
increased in 1990 while public ones continued to decline. This leads to the contradictory 
observation that the role of the inpatient sector declined in the same year when the total 
number of inpatient beds grew for the first time since 1974. By taking the following 
years into account, the year 1990 appears even more exceptional as the PPI immediately 
bounced back to 39 points. The PPI oscillated around this level up to 2006. Therefore, 
we observe a slight privatization trend between 1988 and 2006 as the PPI fell 1.9 points.  
Summing up, the role of the state as a provider of healthcare services was strong in 
the inpatient sector throughout our entire period of observation. In contrast to this, the 
other healthcare sectors were dominated by private providers. Although the introduction 
of the NHS in 1978 led to a peak of public hospital beds’ share, it did not affect private 
provision in the outpatient sector. The independent status of physicians in terms of out-
patient care prevailed as a kind of heritage from the former social insurance system. 
This contributed to a comparatively low public provision index of around 40 percent for 
a NHS country. As the aforementioned healthcare reforms allowed the regions greater 
freedom to enter into contracts with private providers, we observe a continued privatiza-
tion trend in the hospital sector. Therefore, the role of the state as provider of health ser-
vices is expected to decline further in the future.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
Since its inception in 1978, the Italian NHS has undergone a significant transformation 
in the way of decentralization and the introduction of internal market principles. These 
changes in regulation have been direct responses both to problems commonly shared by 
NHS systems, but also the particular failings of the Italian healthcare system in control-
ling regional spending. Within this context, exogenous shocks such as economic crises 
have served to stress the need for reforms, without actually driving them. Of greater 
significance in explaining changes in regulation for this case has been the interaction 
between endogenous or system-specific problems and institutional factors lodged espe-
cially within the regions such as political-administrative culture, political interests, as 
well as levels of corruption. These factors, coupled with the significant role of policy 
ideas in shaping policy solutions, as well as pressure wrought on by public dissatisfac-
tion with the healthcare system have determined the content and timing of reforms. In-
terestingly, despite the persistence of system-specific problems over our period of ob-
servation, the Italian government has responded with great consistency in its reform 
measures, both in periods of acute economic crisis and that of relative stability –namely, 
decentralization or the regionalization of healthcare financing and a (varied) reliance on 
the internal market. This has culminated in a relative retreat of the state in healthcare.  
Findings for financing also demonstrate a relative retreat of the state, with a strong 
growth in private out-of-pocket payments leading to a decline in the public share of fi-
nancing from 83.7 to 77.3 percent over our period of observation. Interestingly, while 
spending cutbacks in the 1970s and 1980s were related to economic crises, the re-
trenchment of the 1990s was dedicated to the Eurozone membership and findings for 
the 2000s demonstrate that neither the splash of the dotcom-bubble nor the recent finan-
cial crisis has thus far had a major impact on public expenditure. Therefore, unlike in 
the case of regulation where endogenous factors play a greater role in determining 
changes, here exogenous factors, particularly Europeanization, have steered changes in 
financing. Meanwhile the decentralization of financing – the major regulatory develop-
ment observed in Italy – appears to have done little to influence trends in financing. 
This absence of effect is most likely due to the ongoing role that redistribution and state 
backing play despite the regionalization of healthcare financing.  
Finally, results for service provision also show a relative retreat of the state. Whereas 
the role of the state as a provider of healthcare services remained quite strong in the in-
patient sector over our entire period of observation, increasing privatization of the hos-
pital sector can nevertheless be observed. Moreover, other healthcare sectors, particu-
larly in the outpatient sector, have been dominated by private providers. This has con-
tributed to a comparatively low public provision index of around 40 percent, which is 
unusual for an NHS country. Mainly, the decline in public provision can be attributed to 
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the 1992/3 regulatory reforms that introduced greater freedoms for regions to enter into 
contracts with private providers. As we have concluded that these reforms are rooted in 
endogenous explanatory factors, we can also derive that changes in service provision 
are to be linked with system-specific deficiencies that have increasingly looked to pri-
vate market arrangements for solutions to perennial problems. Taken together, we find 
that the role of the state in Italian healthcare policy has indeed declined. However, the 
nature of change underpinning this decline varies according to the dimension at hand 
thereby leading to a complex picture of change. 
Our findings therefore point to the significance of using multi-theoretical or holistic 
approaches to understanding change (see also Schmid et al. 2010), as we find evidence 
for the role of institutions (Bonoli and Palier 2000), particularly in the form of endoge-
nous sources of inefficiency lodged within institutions (Cacace et al. 2008; Schmid et al. 
2010) but also normative institutions as in the form of ideas, as well as economic and 
social developments (Castles 2000; Pierson 2001). Moreover, the issue of timing 
(Bonoli 2007; Kingdon 1984) also comes to the fore when explaining change in the Ital-
ian healthcare system, as we have observed that periods of economic crisis have created 
windows of opportunity for reforms without actually dictating their content or purpose. 
As concerns the thesis, 'reform without change and change without reform' (Hacker 
2004: 693), the Italian case demonstrates strong support for the former development: 
despite ongoing decentralization and a weakening role of the state in healthcare policy, 
the perrenial problem of regional spending has not yet been solved. However, what has 
emerged from the reform process is the rather novel phenomenon of a highly regional-
ized National Health Service. 
 
 - 24 - 
NOTES 
[1] The identification of recessions relies on the development of seasonally adjusted 
GDP data in constant prices taken from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts 
(OECD 2011). Dating: Recessions are defined as periods starting with a GDP 
decline (i.e. growth below zero) in two consecutive quarters and ending when 
the GDP surpasses the pre-recession level. Duration: Number of quarters within 
the duration period. The short recovery period in double-dip recessions (occurs 
in Italy only the dot-com bubble) is not included in the duration. Depth: Com-
parison of the lowest quarterly GDP level during a recession with the pre-
recession level measured in percent. 
 First  oil crisis 
Mid-1970s 
recession 
Second 
oil crisis 
Early 1990s 
recession 
Dot-com  
bubble 
Financial 
crisis 
Dating Q4/74–Q4/75 Q2/77–Q4/77 Q1/82–Q2/83 Q2/92–Q1/94 Q2/02–Q3/03 since Q4/07
Duration 5 quarters 3 quarters 6 quarters 8 quarters 7 quarters >14 quarters
Depth −3.8% −1.5% −0.7% −1.9% −0.6% −6.8% 
 
[2] The sample OECD-23 includes all countries which joined the OECD before the 
beginning of the first oil crisis (reference date: October 17, 1973): Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Due to its outlier position Turkey was excluded. 
[3] Regions clustered according to their NUTS-2 code. North represents the 
macroregions ITC and ITC including the regions Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, 
Lombardia, Trentino, Veneto, Friuli, Liguria, and Emilia Romagna. Center 
represents the macroregion ITE including the regions Toscana, Umbria, Marche, 
Lazio, and Abruzzo. South represents the macroregions ITF and ITG including 
the regions Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, and 
Sardegna. 
[4] Data for number of hospital beds per 1000 population taken from the WHO 
HFA-DB (2010a) multiplied with the (calculated) share of public and private 
hospital beds based on following sources: 1976-86 Fausto (1990: 223), 1987-91 
WHO HFA-DB (2010a), 1992-95 imputed with geometric mean, 1996-2006 
WHO HFA-ITA (2010b). 
[5] Data for the share of public pharmacies taken from the comparative statistics 
provided by the European Union of Social Pharmacies. The Indicator takes the 
number of public and private pharmacies into account but not their size (e.g. 
employees, dispensed drugs, or revenue). 
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